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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of 
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78A-4-103, 63G-4-403; and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was the Workforce Appeals Board's decision that the Claimant was discharged 
without just cause reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the 
record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of whether the Employer had just cause to discharge the Claimant is 
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Johnson 
v. Department ofEmp't Sec, 882 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When reviewing 
an agency's application of the law to a particular set of facts, the Court gives a degree of 
deference to the agency and will uphold the Board's decision so long as the decision is 
"within the realm of reasonableness and rationality." EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of 
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 43, ^43. The Board's findings will be reversed "only if 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of 
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evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the evidence." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus/ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ^35 (omission 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, this Court will "defer to the 
Board's assessment of conflicting evidence." Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp't 
Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). It is not the Court's "role to judge the 
relative credibility of the witnesses." Id. "It is the province of the Board, not the 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be 
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id. 
STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim 
in Addendum A, and include the following: 
§35A-4-307(l), Utah Code Annotated 
§35A-4-405(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated 
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated 
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated 
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce 
Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department). 
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The Claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after the 
Employer terminated his employment. The Department issued a decision finding the 
Claimant had been discharged from his employment with just cause and was therefore 
ineligible for benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act, Code Ann. §35A-4-
405(2)(a). (All Utah Code provisions are found sequentially at Addendum A, 
Department decisions at Addendum B.) The Employer was relieved of benefit charges 
under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-307. 
The Claimant appealed the Department decision to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). After an evidentiary hearing at which both the Claimant and the Employer were 
present, the ALJ determined the Employer failed to meet its burden to prove it discharged 
the Claimant for just cause under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2), thereby reversing the 
Department's decision and making the Claimant eligible for benefits. (Addendum C) 
The Employer appealed the decision to the Workforce Appeals Board. The majority of 
the Board upheld the decision of the ALJ. (Addendum D) The present petition for 
review ensued. 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
The Board supplements and corrects the Employer's Statement of the Facts as 
follows: 
The Claimant worked as a sales representative for the Employer from March 1, 
2010, until he was discharged on May 14, 2010. (Record, 042: 10-25). The Claimant 
worked on a commission-only basis. (R, 043: 3-6). The Claimant received a schedule 
when he first started work that was designed to maximize client contact opportunities. 
3 
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(R, 063: 3-7). As a skilled sales representative working on a commission-only basis, the 
Claimant felt this schedule was a suggested schedule and he was free to deviate from the 
schedule in order to set appointments and meet client needs. (R, 049: 16-18; 055: 5; 58: 
21-24; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23). 
The Claimant often saw other employees, including his team leader, deviate from 
their schedules, often without discussing the matter with a supervisor. (R, 058: 29-31; 
066: 23-29). The Claimant often left early or arrived late, yet still worked more than 46 
hours each week, which was more than the number of hours he was expected to work. 
(R, 042: 35-41). The Employer found the Claimant to be a very skilled salesman and 
often considered him an asset to the sales team. (R, 055: 5-23). 
The Employer was bothered by the Claimant's attendance. Despite "several verbal 
warnings," however, the Employer took no concrete action with the Claimant until it 
issued a written warning on April 12, 2010. (R, 048: 25-32). The Claimant was late on 
that day as he was carpooling with a coworker. (R, 061: 30-41). The Claimant missed an 
appointment with a potential customer that was originally scheduled for 9:00 a.m. (Id.). 
The Claimant remedied the problem, however, contacting the customer as soon as he 
arrived at work. (Id.). 
The Employer issued a written warning on April 12, 2010, describing the 
Employer's concern over the missed appointment and outlining the schedule the 
Employer expected the Claimant to work. (R, 009). There is no indication in the record 
the Claimant missed a scheduled appointment after April 12. 
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The Claimant continued to feel the Employer's schedule was a suggested schedule 
and he was free to deviate from the schedule. (R, 063: 3-7; 068: 19-25, 39-44; 069: 1-12, 
17-23). Despite the language contained in the written warning, the Claimant never 
believed his job was in jeopardy as he felt he was meeting the Employer's expectations 
and doing his best. (R, 064: 40-43; 065: 1-8; 068: 19-25, 39-44; 069: 1-12, 17-23). 
The Claimant still did not adhere to the schedule issued by the Employer after 
April 12, continuing to come and go as he wished. (R, 008). He was late on April 26. 
{Id.). The Employer did not issue another warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant 
after this incident. The Claimant was late on May 7. {Id.; R, 045: 41-42). Again, the 
Employer did not issue another warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant. The 
Employer claimed the Claimant failed to report to work and did not contact his supervisor 
regarding his failure to report on May 10. (R, 008; 045: 12-22). The Employer provided 
little detail about the Claimant's no call/no show on May 10, but failed to issue another 
warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant. The Claimant was late for work again on 
May 11. (R, 008; 044: 19-25). Again, the Employer took no action. Finally, the 
Claimant left work early on May 13. (R, 008; 043: 23-27). The Employer discharged 
him the following day. 
When the Employer discharged the Claimant, it did not tell the Claimant he was 
being discharged for attendance issues, citing instead the Claimant's attitude, 
argumentative nature, and communication problems. (R, 069: 28-40; 070: 9-15, 21-30). 
5 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Board correctly determined the Employer discharged the Claimant without 
just cause based on the substantial evidence in the record. Because the Employer failed 
to establish just cause to discharge the Claimant, the Claimant is eligible for benefits. 
The Employer failed to establish its legitimate interests were threatened by the Claimant's 
attendance, the Claimant knew he was expected to strictly adhere to the work schedule 
the Employer had given to him, or he had the requisite control over the actions that led to 
his eventual discharge. The Board's decision to allow benefits is reasonable and rational. 
It is supported by substantial evidence in the record and this Court should deny the 
Employer's appeal. 
On appeal to this Court, the Employer argues it satisfied the necessary elements to 
establish just cause. The Employer argues the Claimant's attendance was sufficiently 
culpable, the Claimant knew he was expected to work his assigned schedule, and it was 
within his control to do so. The Employer, however, failed to show how the Claimant's 
actions damaged or threatened its legitimate interests, that the Claimant knew his actions 
were contrary to the Employer's expectations, that he could have anticipated negative 
consequences would result from his actions, or that he could have anticipated the 
Employer would suddenly find his conduct so objectionable it would lead to his 
immediate discharge. 
The Employer also failed to marshal the evidence to show the Board's decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence, marshaling only the evidence supporting its 
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contention the Claimant was discharged for just cause and ignoring any evidence contrary 
to its desired outcome. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION THAT THE EMPLOYER 
DISHARGED THE CLAIMANT WITHOUT JUST CAUSE 
WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
The Employer argues on appeal that it established just cause for the Claimant's 
discharge in that it discharged the Claimant for failing to adhere to his schedule. The 
Employer argues the Claimant's attendance problem, absent any significant harm or 
threat of significant harm, is sufficient to establish the element of culpability. The 
Employer also argues the Claimant knew the Employer expected him to work the 
assigned schedule and it was in his control to do so. 
A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just case as 
defined in Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202. {See Addendum A). In establishing 
whether a claimant was discharged for just cause, the employer has the burden of 
proving: (1) the claimant's culpability, (2) the claimant's knowledge of expected conduct, 
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control. See Bhatia v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The employer 
must establish each of the three elements in order for the claimant to be denied benefits. 
Id., at 577. 
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Here, the majority of the Board found the Employer failed to prove any of the 
elements necessary to establish just cause. While discharged for not strictly adhering to 
the Employer's work schedule, the Claimant still worked more hours than he was 
expected to work each week. There is also no indication the Claimant's conduct resulted 
in lost clients, lost revenue for the Employer, or missed opportunities to meet with clients 
or customers. There is no indication the Claimant's conduct undermined the Employer's 
authority or affected its ability to maintain discipline in the workplace. Indeed, it is not 
clear how the Employer was damaged other than the Claimant's supervisor did not always 
know where he was. Further, the Claimant did not understand the work schedule to be 
anything other than a suggested schedule designed to maximize customer contact 
opportunities. He saw other employees come and go as they pleased and had been 
allowed to do so for most of his time with the Employer. As such, he was not in control 
of the fact the Employer would suddenly find this conduct objectionable. 
A. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Culpability 
In order to demonstrate the element of culpability, the Employer must show the 
conduct causing the discharge to be so serious that continuing the employment 
relationship would jeopardize its legitimate interests. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
202(1). Here, the Employer failed to establish the Claimant's conduct was so serious it 
jeopardized the Employer's legitimate interests. The ALJ and Board found the Employer 
failed to show how the Claimant's actions actually threatened the Employer's rightful 
interests. The Board further found that as a commission-only employee, and as an 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
experienced salesman, the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in his schedule in 
order to better meet client needs and to maximize his personal income. 
The Employer argues on appeal the Claimant's refusal to strictly adhere to his 
work schedule is sufficiently culpable. The Employer again fails to articulate exactly 
how the Claimant's conduct threatened its interests, but argues the rules governing 
unemployment benefits make it clear the Claimant's attendance was sufficiently 
problematic to suffice as culpable conduct. The Employer cites a number of Utah 
Administrative Code provisions for the premise the Claimant's attendance problems, by 
themselves, are sufficiently culpable to justify its decision to discharge the Claimant. 
This case, however, is not about whether the provisions of the administrative code 
can be applied to the Claimant. Rather, this case is about culpability. The unique pay 
structure in this case, coupled with the Claimant's obligation to meet with clients based 
on their schedule and the Employer's failure to identify how the Claimant's actions 
actually threatened its legitimate interests led the majority of the Board to conclude the 
Claimant's conduct was simply not culpable. 
The Employer failed to specify how its legitimate interests were threatened by the 
Claimant's conduct. The Employer testified briefly as to how the Claimant's actions 
could have damaged the Claimant's interests, but there is no indication in the record the 
Claimant's conduct actually did or potentially could have threatened the Employer's 
interests. Speaking of its employees in general, the Employer speculated that "[wjhen 
they're not here at work obviously they're not able to contact the clients that they've given 
charge over, and thus would lead to a lack of revenue . . . and sales for the organization." 
9 
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(R, 048: 10-15). Aside from the missed appointment on April 125 the Employer did not 
testify the Claimant's actions actually resulted in the Claimant failing to contact clients or 
a loss of revenue for the Employer, just that the Claimants conduct could potentially 
result in such consequences. 
There is also no indication in the record the Claimant's conduct resulted in poor 
performance or caused him not to meet his sales requirements. Rather, the Employer 
testified the Claimant was a "skilled salesman" and was often, though not always, an 
asset to his sales team. (R, 055: 5, 23). 
Likewise, the Employer also testified the Claimant's conduct led "obviously to a 
lack of trust from Employer to employee." (R, 048: 19). Again, given that the Employer 
failed to articulate how the Claimant's conduct threatened its interests, it is not clear how 
the Claimant's conduct could have led to a loss of trust. 
The Employer argues on appeal the Claimant's conduct led to disciplinary 
problems and undermined the Employer's authority. While the Employer was no doubt 
frustrated with the Claimant, there is no indication in the record that the Claimant's 
conduct led to disciplinary problems or undermined the Employer's authority. The 
Employer failed to provide testimony that the Claimant's conduct resulted in attendance 
problems for other sales representatives. The Employer also failed to provide testimony 
the Claimant's conduct undermined its authority other than the Claimant was not always 
at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to be. 
Indeed, the Employer was unable to identify any specific examples of harm caused 
by the Claimant's attendance problems. See RKB Industrial, Inc., v. Department of 
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Workforce Servs., 2003 UT App 180, *4 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (employer was unable to 
establish element of culpability as it was "unable to document a single example of harm" 
caused by claimant's tardiness). Moreover, in Whipple v. Department of Workforce 
Servs., 2004 UT App 479 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), the Court agreed with the Department's 
determination that tardiness alone was insufficient to establish culpability as the 
employer had tolerated, reluctantly, the claimant's refusal to follow the employer's 
attendance policy. Id. at *4. The claimant in Whipple had been discharged after her 
repeated refusal to adhere to a specific work schedule led to morale problems with other 
employees. The Court upheld the Department's determination the Claimant's culpability 
arose from her flaunting of the attendance policy, which disrupted the workplace and 
resulted in morale problems for other employees. Id. There is no indication in the 
present case that the Claimant's conduct caused disruptions in the workplace or affected 
the morale of his coworkers. 
Despite the Claimant's attendance issues, he still averaged more than 46 hours 
each week. (R, 042: 36). The majority of the Board found the Claimant was entitled to 
some latitude in his schedule, particularly in light of the hours the Claimant worked each 
week and in light of the unique pay structure in this instance; the Claimant was paid 
solely on commissions. The Employer argues for the first time on appeal the Employer 
was required to pay the difference between any commissions earned and minimum wage 
should the Claimant fail to make minimum wage through his commissions. There is, 
however, no indication in the record the Claimant ever failed to make at least minimum 
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wage through his commissions or the Employer was ever forced to make up that 
difference. 
Inasmuch as the Claimant was responsible for maximizing his personal income, 
which would in turn maximize the revenue realized by the Employer, the majority of the 
Board found the Claimant was entitled to manipulate his schedule in order to meet client 
needs and to maximize revenue. The Board's finding that the Employer failed to 
establish the element of culpability was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial 
evidence. 
B. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Knowledge 
In order to establish the element of knowledge, the Employer must show the 
Claimant understood the conduct the Employer expected. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
202(2). The Employer must also show the Claimant should have been able to anticipate 
the negative effect of his conduct. Id. 
Here, the Employer failed to show the Claimant understood he was expected to 
strictly adhere to the work schedule outlined by the Employer. The ALJ and Board found 
the Claimant provided credible testimony he thought the schedule was a suggestion, he 
thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations, and he could not have anticipated 
the negative consequences that would result from his conduct. The Board's decision was 
reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
The Employer argues on appeal the warning issued on April 12 was sufficient to 
establish the element of knowledge and the Claimant was discharged for his failure to 
strictly adhere to the schedule as outlined by the Employer when the Claimant was first 
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hired and as detailed in the April 12 warning. The Claimant, however, testified he saw 
other sales representatives come and go at their discretion. (R, 058: 29-42; 066: 23-29). 
The Claimant also testified the schedule was presented to him as a schedule that other 
teams had experienced success with and one the Employer would like all sales 
representatives to utilize. (R, 063: 3-5). He also testified that it was his understanding 
there was not a set schedule because of the commission-only structure of the job and that 
he had the flexibility to schedule meetings with clients outside of the schedule outlined 
by the Employer. (R, 063: 6-7; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23). The Claimant also testified he 
never thought his job was in jeopardy, was surprised when he was discharged, and 
thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations. (R, 064: 40-43; 065: 1-4; 068: 19-
25; 058: 23-24). 
The Employer was never satisfied with the Claimant's attendance, testifying that it 
issued several verbal warnings and expressed its dissatisfaction through email messages. 
(R, 048: 25-36). Despite its dissatisfaction, the Employer did not issue a warning until 
April 12. Further, even though the Claimant's attendance and conduct did not improve 
after April 12, the Employer took no further action until it suddenly decided to discharge 
the Claimant on May 14. This, coupled with the Claimant's testimony, led the majority 
of the Board to determine the Employer had condoned the Claimant's behavior, even if it 
did so reluctantly. 
The Employer also condoned an atmosphere in which work schedules were not 
strictly adhered to, with employees coming and going as they pleased. (R, 058: 29-42; 
066: 23-29). The Claimant had been allowed to alter his schedule repeatedly without 
13 
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repercussion. He also saw other employees engaged in similar conduct. The Claimant 
also believed the schedule was a suggested schedule intended to maximize client contact 
and thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations by working more than 40 hours 
each week. As such, he could not possibly have anticipated that the Employer would 
suddenly find his conduct so egregious that it necessitated his immediate discharge. 
The Board's determination that the Employer failed to establish the element of 
knowledge was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
C. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Control 
In order to establish the element of control, the Employer must show the conduct 
causing the discharge was within the Claimant's control. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
202(3)(a). The Employer argues on appeal neither the ALJ nor the Board addressed the 
issue of control on appeal and that it was within the Claimant's control to adhere to the 
work schedule and to notify his supervisor if he needed to deviate from his schedule. The 
Employer, however, misreads the Board's decision. The majority of the Board found 
absent a clear understanding of the Employer's expectations, the Claimant could not 
possibly have conformed his conduct to meet the Employer's expectations. 
The Employer failed to establish the element of knowledge. The element of 
knowledge must be established in order to establish the element of control. The Claimant 
testified he thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations, he never thought his job 
was in jeopardy, and he was surprised when he was discharged. (R, 068: 19-25; 058: 23-
24; 064: 40-43; 065: 1-4). He also testified he saw coworkers behave in a similar 
manner, that the schedule was presented to him as a suggestion, and as a commission-
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only employee charged with sales he had the flexibility to alter his schedule to meet 
client demands. (R, 058: 29-42; 066: 23-29; 063: 3-7; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23). The 
Employer also testified it had long been dissatisfied with the Claimant's attendance but 
had issued only verbal and email warnings. It also failed to take any action after issuing 
the April 12 warning even though the Claimant's conduct did not improve. 
The Employer tolerated the Claimant's poor attendance from the beginning of his 
employment. The Claimant saw coworkers come and go as they pleased. He also 
thought the schedule as outlined by the Employer was a suggestion and he could alter his 
schedule when necessary. He also felt he was meeting the Employer's expectations. The 
Employer failed to demonstrate he should have known he was not meeting its 
expectations or he should have been able to anticipate the negative consequences that 
would result from his continued conduct. Inasmuch as the Claimant did not understand 
he was acting contrary to the Employer's expectation, he could not have altered his 
conduct to avoid being discharged. The Board's decision that the Employer failed to 
establish the element of control was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial 
evidence. 
II. THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL, 
In finding the Employer failed to sustain its burden of proving the Claimant was 
terminated for just cause, the Board relied on the provisions of the Employment Security 
Act, the Utah Rules of Evidence, and case law. In order to successfully challenge this 
finding, the Employer "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by 
15 
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substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court 
should reject the Employer's appeal for its failure to marshal the evidence in support of its 
conclusion the findings were without foundation. The burden is an extremely heavy one 
and the Employer has presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this 
burden. 
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court refused to 
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its 
marshaling burden: 
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the 
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead 
cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence 
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden. 
. . ."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the 
trial court. Id. at 820. [Emphasis added] 
This Court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994): 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042. 
The Court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West 
16 
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Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). The Court 
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to: 
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); 
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
Oneida at 1053. 
Then, after an appellant has established: 
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to 
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Barttell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
Oneida at 1053. 
The Employer here has not met its marshaling burden. It has pointed to no 
evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against the clear 
weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is supported 
by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this court held: 
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the 
Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 67-68. 
In the recent unemployment case of Target Interact US, LLC v. Workforce 
Appeals Bd., 2010 UT App 255 this court noted the employer failed to marshal the 
evidence on appeal stating: 
17 
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we note that Target's briefing is deficient in several respects and that these 
defects alone would be grounds for this court to decline to disturb the 
Board's decision. Of particular concern is Target's failure to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Board's decision. See generally Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 
UT 42, P 17, 164 P.3d 384 & n.3, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ("To 
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party must 
marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Target's 
central disagreement with the Board's decision is factual, and Target's 
failure to marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision 
impermissibly shifts the burden of combing the record for supporting 
evidence onto this court. 
In a separate concurring opinion in Target, Judge Voros wrote: 
I concur in the result and in that portion of the memorandum 
decision concluding that Target's briefing does not satisfy the 
requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While 
I agree that Target's claims of error lack merit, I would affirm on the 
ground that they are inadequately briefed. 
The Employer in this case also failed to meet its marshaling burden. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should find the substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's 
determination the Claimant was discharged without just cause and therefore is eligible 
for benefits. The Employer failed to establish the elements of culpability, knowledge, 
and control. It also failed to marshal the evidence in support of its appeal. The Board's 
decision was reasonable and rational. As such, the Board requests the Court deny the 
Employer's appeal and affirm the Board's decision. 
18 
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Respectfully submitted this / c / / day of February, 2010. 
<^^vS 
JAMESON R. MAUGHAft 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
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35A-4-307. Social costs — Relief of charges. 
(1) Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows: 
(a) Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period 
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation from 
that employer occurred under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit 
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently 
requalified for benefits and actually received benefits; 
(ii) the individual received benefits following a quit which was not 
attributable to the employer; 
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for 
nonperformance due to medical reasons; or 
(iv) the individual received benefits while attending the first week of 
mandatory apprenticeship training. 
(b) Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to 
employers who have terminated coverage and are no longer liable for 
contributions, less the amount of contributions paid by such employers during the 
same time period. 
(c) The difference between the benefit charges of all employers whose 
benefit ratio exceeds the maximum overall contribution rate and the amount 
determined by multiplying the taxable payroll of the same employers by the 
maximum overall contribution rate is a social cost. 
(d) Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer will 
not be charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of work for 
that employer have not been reduced. 
(e) Benefit costs incurred during the course of division-approved 
training which occurs after December 31,1985, will not be charged to base-period 
employers. 
(f) Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are 
attributable to: 
(i) the state's share of extended benefits; 
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(ii) uncollectible benefit overpayments; 
(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of combined wage claims that are 
chargeable to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately considered for 
a monetary eligible claim under Utah law and which have been transferred to a 
paying state; and 
(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit year 
that are available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-401 (2) because 
of a change in method of computing base-periods, overlapping base-periods, or 
for other reasons required by law. 
(g) Any benefit costs that are not charged to an employer and not 
defined in this subsection are also social costs. 
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35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits. 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(1 )(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good 
cause, if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has 
performed services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those 
services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant 
leaves work under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to impose a disqualification. 
(c) Using available information from employers and the claimant, the 
division shall consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the 
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing 
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant who 
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or in 
a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of Subsection (1). 
(2)(a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or 
for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, 
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, 
if so found by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount 
equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
(b) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for dishonesty 
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with the 
claimant's work as shown by the facts, together with the claimant's admission, or as 
shown by the claimant's conviction of that crime in a court of competent jurisdiction 
and for the 51 next following weeks. 
(c) Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base period, and are 
not available for this or any subsequent claim for benefits. 
(3)(a)(i) If the division finds that the claimant has failed without good cause 
to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to suitable work 
offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work offered by an employer 
or the employment office. 
(ii) The ineligibility continues until the claimant has performed services 
in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for the services in an amount 
equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
(b)(i) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to 
apply, accept referral, or accept available suitable work under circumstances where 
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
(ii) The division shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the 
reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence 
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a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of the claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
(c) In determining whether work is suitable for an individual, the division 
shall consider the: 
(i) degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals; 
(ii) individual's physical fitness and prior training; 
(iii) individual's prior earnings and experience; 
(iv) individual's length of unemployment; 
(v) prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation; 
(vi) wages for similar work in the locality; and 
(vii) distance of the available work from his residence. 
(d) Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters used 
in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the most recent employer. 
The division shall be more prone to find work as suitable the longer the claimant has 
been unemployed and the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his 
customary occupation. 
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is 
suitable, and benefits may not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise eligible 
individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or 
other labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are 
substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work 
in the locality; or 
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required 
to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor 
organization. 
(4) For any week in which the division finds that the claimant's 
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work that exists because of a strike involving 
the claimant's grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at 
which the claimant is or was last employed. 
(a) If the division finds that a strike has been fomented by a worker of any 
employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or group of workers of the 
individual who is found to be a party to the plan, or agreement to foment a strike, 
shall be eligible for benefits. However, if the division finds that the strike is caused 
by the failure or refusal of any employer to conform to any law of the state or of the 
United States pertaining to hours, wages, or other conditions of work, the strike may 
not render the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(b) If the division finds that the employer, the employer's agent or 
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representative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of the employer's workers, 
their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike may not render the 
workers ineligible for benefits. 
(c) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to the worker's 
unemployment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (4), the worker has 
obtained employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount specified 
in Subsection 35A-4-401(4) and has worked as specified in Subsection 35A-4-
403(l)(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to this strike the wages 
of the worker used for the determination of his benefit rights may not include any 
wages the worker earned from the employer involved in the strike. 
(5)(a) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a 
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to 
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an additional 13 weeks 
for the first week the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six 
weeks for each week thereafter; the additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. 
(b) The additional period shall commence on the Sunday following the 
issuance of a determination finding the claimant in violation of this Subsection (5). 
(c)(i) Each individual found in violation of this Subsection (5) shall repay 
to the division the overpayment and, as a civil penalty, an amount equal to the 
overpayment. 
(ii) The overpayment is the amount of benefits the claimant received by 
direct reason of fraud. 
(iii) The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this 
chapter. 
(iv) These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the 
manner provided in Subsections 35A-4-305(3) and (5). 
(d) A claimant is ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit, and 
any wage credits earned by the claimant shall be unavailable for purposes of paying 
benefits, if any amount owed under this Subsection (5) remains unpaid. 
(e) Determinations under this Subsection (5) shall be appealable in the 
manner provided by this chapter for appeals from other benefit determinations. 
(f) If the fraud determination is based solely on unreported or under 
reported work or earnings, or both, and the claimant would have been eligible for 
benefits if the work or earnings, or both, had been correctly reported, the individual 
does not lose eligibility because of the misreporting but is liable for the overpayment 
and the penalties in Subsection (5)(c). 
(6) For any week with respect to which or a part of which the claimant 
has received or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment 
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate agency of 
the other state or of the United States finally determines that the claimant is not 
entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification does not apply. 
(7)(a) For any week with respect to which the claimant is receiving, has 
received, or is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(i) wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or 
(ii) accrued vacation or terminal leave payment. 
(b) If the remuneration is less than the benefits that would otherwise be 
due, the claimant is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits 
reduced as provided in Subsection 35A-4-401(3). 
(8)(a) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on service 
for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or principal administrative 
capacity and that begins during the period between two successive academic years, 
or during a similar period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or 
during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract if the 
individual performs services in the first of those academic years or terms and if there 
is a contract or reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in that 
capacity for an educational institution in the second of the academic years or terms. 
(b)(1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on service 
in any other capacity for an educational institution, and that week begins during a 
period between two successive academic years or terms if the individual performs 
those services in the first of the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable 
assurance that the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic 
years or terms. 
(ii) If compensation is denied to any individual under this Subsection (8) 
and the individual was not offered an opportunity to perform the services for the 
educational institution for the second of the academic years or terms, the individual 
shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which 
the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was 
denied solely by reason of this Subsection (8). 
(c) With respect to any services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b), 
compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be denied to an individual 
for any week that commences during an established and customary vacation period 
or holiday recess if the individual performs the services in the period immediately 
before the vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform the services in the period immediately following the 
vacation period or holiday recess. 
(d)(i) With respect to services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b), 
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in Subsection (8)(a), 
(b), or (c) shall be denied to an individual who performed those services in an 
education institution while in the employ of an educational service agency. 
(ii) For purposes of Subsection (8)(d), "educational service agency" means 
a governmental agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose 
of providing the services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) to an educational 
institution. 
(e) Benefits based on service in employment, defined in Subsections 3 5 A-
4-204(2)(d) and (e) are payable in the same amount, on the same terms and subject 
to the same conditions as compensation payable on the basis of other service subject 
to this chapter. 
(9) For any week that commences during the period between two 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
successive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any services, 
substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or athletic events or 
training or preparing to participate in the first of those seasons or similar periods and 
there is a reasonable assurance that individual will perform those services in the later 
of the seasons or similar periods. 
(10)(a) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services 
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence at the time the services were performed, was 
lawfully present for purposes of performing the services or, was permanently residing 
in the United States under color of law at the time the services were performed, 
including an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the 
application of Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1182(d)(5)(A). 
(b) Any data or information required of individuals applying for benefits 
to determine whether benefits are not payable to them because of their alien status 
shall be uniformly required from all applicants for benefits. 
(c) In the case of an individual whose application for benefits would 
otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the individual are not 
payable because of his alien status shall be made except upon a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
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35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law 
judge — Division of adjudication — Workforce Appeals Board — Judicial 
review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure. 
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, 
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of 
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which action 
any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be made a 
defendant. 
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63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, 
or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it 
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's 
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able 
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a 
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's 
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of 
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have 
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe 
infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the 
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a 
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the 
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits 
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due 
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
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perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
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REV 10/03" UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANC ADD 
DECISION OF ELIGIBILITY FOK 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
DATE MAILED: 6/8/10 ELECTRONIC DCAT 
MATT DAVIS SSN: XXX-XX-X361 
1567S2300E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108-2775 EMPLOYER: PROSPER TEAM, INC. 
lot ice: This decis ion is made on your claim for benef i ts: 
ou were discharged from your job for absenteeism or tardiness after you failed to call in or report to work as scheduled. 
ou were discharged from your job for just cause. Your conduct was within your control and was adverse to your employer's 
ghtful interests. You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your employer or your employer's expectations and you knew or 
lould have known the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer. 
enefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act beginning May 9, 2010 and ending when 
XJ have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are 
herwise eligible. To reopen your claim, you can file on-line at jobs.utah.gov or you can call the Claim Center. This reopening will 
3 effective as of the week you reopen your claim. You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim. 
IGHT TO APPEAL: If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to: Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals 
ection, PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244, or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online at www.jobs.utah.gov. Your appeal must 
5 in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before June 23, 2010. An appeal received or postmarked after June 23, 
)10 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established. Your appeal must be signed by you or your legal 
presentative. MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY 
UMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS. Also, please state the reason for your appeal. A copy of your appeal will be sent to any 
her interested parties. It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is pending. You 
ill not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing. 
TAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS: S.L.: 526-4400, Ogden: 612-0877, Provo: 375-4067, Out of Area: (888) 848-0688. 
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S.S.A. NO: XXX-XX-1361 CASE NO: 10-A-10679-R 
APPEAL DECISION: The request to reopen the hearing is granted. 
The Department decision is reversed. 
The Claimant is allowed unemployment benefits. 
The Employer is charged. 
CASE HISTORY: 
Original Hearing Dates: June 22 and July 7,2010 
Dates of Appeal Decisions: June 21 and July 7,2010 
Requests for Reopening Dated: June 22 and July 13, 2010 
Appearances: Claimant and Employer 
Issues to be Decided: R994-508-117 and R994-508-118 - Failure to Appear 
35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge 
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges 
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was 
discharged for just cause. That decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid 
to the Claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from August 3, 
2010, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://wwwjobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the 
grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Failure to Appear 
The Claimant received the first Notice of Hearing the day before the hearing was to take place. He did not 
understand that he needed to call in at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. On the day of the hearing the 
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Claimant called the Appeals Unit and was told he could request reopening of the hearing. He filed his 
request the same day. A new hearing was scheduled for July 7, 2010. The Claimant called prior to the 
hearing and provided a telephone number. His phone did not ring on the day of the hearing, but the 
Claimant noticed later that he had received a voice mail message from the Administrative Law Judge. He 
called the Appeals Unit within ten minutes but he was too late to participate in the hearing. The Claimant 
filed a second request to reopen the hearing within the time period allowed. 
Separation from Employment 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment benefits effective May 9, 2010, the Claimant worked as a sales 
representative for Prosper Team Inc. starting on March 1, 2010. The Claimant worked five or six days a 
week and earned a straight commission. He was discharged on May 14, 2010, for attendance problems. 
The Employer reviewed its attendance policy on the day of the Claimant's work orientation. The Claimant 
did not recall specifics about the attendance policy, but he did understand that he was to call his supervisor 
if he was going to be late or absent, and he understood he should work a minimum of 40 hours per week. 
The Employer did not provide a copy of the attendance policy for the hearing. 
The Claimant's team leader gave all the sales representatives on his team a work schedule that indicated 
"higher contact hours'5 or the times that sales reps were most likely to reach potential customers. He said 
that another team had tried it and found it to be helpful. The scheduled work times were: Monday 8 a.m. 
to 5 p.m., Tuesday through Thursday 12 p.m. to 8 p.m., Friday 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and Saturday 8:30 a.m. to 
2 p.m. The Claimant believed the schedule was a suggested, or recommended, schedule. He did not always 
adhere to the schedule because he made appointments at the convenience of his customers. The Claimant 
came and went from the office as he saw fit. His work hours averaged 46.36 per week. The Claimant was 
aware that other sales reps also came and went from the office at unscheduled times on a regular basis. 
On April 12,2010, the Claimant's car was being repaired. He had arranged to car pool with a coworker for 
two weeks." On April 12, the coworker was late picking the Claimant up. The Claimant did not call his 
supervisor to say he would be late. The Claimant missed an opportunity to speak with a potential customer 
at 9 a.m. He called the customer later that day and scheduled an appointment. The Claimant's team leader 
gave the Claimant a written warning for being late that day, not calling in, and missing a consultation. The 
written warning included the sales reps' schedule and instructed the Claimant to work the schedule and let 
his team lead know if he was going to be late or absent. After the Claimant received the warning he made 
an effort to meet the Employer's expectations. He still did not understand that the stated schedule was 
anything other than a recommendation. 
The Employer's records indicate the Claimant did not work on Monday, May 10, The Claimant did not 
remember whether he worked that day or not. He may have worked but failed to clock in and out, or the 
time clock may have been out of order, which was not unusual On May 11, the Claimant was scheduled 
to work at 12 p.m. but did not arrive until 1:05 p.m. because his car would not start and he had to get it to 
a friend for help. On May 12/2010, the Claimant worked 9.35 hours. On May 13, the Claimant was 
scheduled to work until 8 p.m. but he left at 5:11 p.m., after working 7.37 hours. The Claimant was 
discharged on May 14, 2010, for not adhering to the schedule. 
f\ (*W f\ 
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Failure to Appear 
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provide, in pertinent part: 
R994-508-II7. Failure to Participate in the Hearing and Reopening the Hearing 
After the Hearing Has Been Concluded. 
(1) If a party fails to appear for or participate in the hearing, either personally or 
through a representative, the ALJ may take evidence from participating parties and will issue 
a decision based on the best available evidence. 
(2) Any party failing to participate, personally or through a representative, may 
request that the hearing be reopened. 
(3) The request must be in writing, must set forth the reason for the request, and 
must be mailed, faxed, or delivered to the Appeals Unit within ten days of the issuance of 
the decision issued under Subsection (1).. . . 
R994-508-118. What Constitutes Grounds to Reopen a Hearing. 
(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from appearing 
at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control. 
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the following 
reasons; mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the decision 
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally construed 
in favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and present their case. Any 
doubt must be resolved in favor of granting reopening. 
(4) Excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to 
circumstances beyond the party's control 
(5) The ALJ has the discretion to schedule a hearing to determine if a party 
requesting reopening satisfied the requirements of this rule or may, after giving the other 
parties an opportunity to respond to the request, grant or deny the request on the basis of the 
record in the case. 
In this case the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a reopening of the hearing to allow 
all parties the opportunity to be heard, and the failure to participate in the hearing falls within the definition 
of excusable neglect. 
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Separation from Employment 
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the 
employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the'employee involved. The basic factors as 
established by the rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are: 
(a) Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing 
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests . . . 
(b) Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected . . . 
(c) Control. The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. . . 
The element of culpability is not established. Although the Claimant did not consistently adhere to the 
schedule supplied by his team leader, he nevertheless worked an average of 46.36 hours per week. Further, 
the Claimant worked on a straight commission basis. The Claimant's failure to stick to the schedule set 
forth by the Employer may have caused some concern for his team leader, but this situation was not so 
serious that the Claimant needed to be discharged immediately. The team leader may have thought the stated 
schedule would lead to more contacts with clients and more revenue, but the Employer did not show how 
it was harmed by the Claimant's occasional adjustment to his work hours. 
The element of knowledge is not established. The Claimant followed the Employer's attendance policy as 
he understood it. He understood that he was to notify his team leader if he was going to be late or absent, 
and he generally did. Even after he received a written warning, the Claimant believed the stated schedule 
was more of a recommendation. He continued to see other sales reps, as well as his team lead, come and 
go at unscheduled times. He believed that by putting in more than 40 hours of work each week, he was 
meeting the Employer's expectations. He did not know his job was in jeopardy and was shocked at his 
discharge. 
The element of control has not been established. Because the Claimant did not understand that the schedule 
was more than a recommendation or suggestion, he could not conform his behavior to avoid his discharge. 
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Employer has not established any of the three elements of 
just cause and benefits are allowed. 
s\ t~\ /% 
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DECISION AND ORDER: 
Failure to Appear 
The request for reopening of the hearing is allowed in accordance with provisions of Paragraphs R994-508-
117 and R994-508-118 of the unemployment insurance rules for Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Separation 
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective 
May 9,2010, and continuing, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible. 
The Employer is not relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 
35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
'Rot 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
Issued: August 3, 2010 
RS/tc 
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Division of Adjudication 
MATT DAVIS, CLAIMANT 
S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-1361 : 
: Case No. 10-B-01134 
PROSPER TEAM, INC., 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are allowed. 
The Employer is not relieved of benefit charges. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated August 3,2010, Case No. 10-A-10679-R, the Administrative Law Judge reversed 
the Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective 
May 9, 2010. The Employer, Prosper Team, Inc., was ineligible for relief of benefit charges in 
connection with this claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: September 1, 2010. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
2. Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in foil tfefciaetual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked for the Employer as a sales representative from March 15 2010, until he was 
discharged on May 14, 2010. He earned a straight commission. The Claimant received a work 
schedule from his team leader which was designed to take advantage of those times when sales 
representatives were most likely to reach potential customers. The Claimant believed the schedule 
was a recommended schedule and did not always follow the schedule. He made appointments at the 
convenience of his customers. He also went to work and left when he saw fit. The Claimant felt this 
was appropriate as other sales representatives, including his team leader, often worked different 
schedules. Despite this, the Claimant averaged 46.36 hours of work each week. 
The Claimant received a written warning for being late on April 12,2010. The Claimant was riding 
to work with a coworker and did not contact his supervisor when he was running late. The written 
warning included an instruction to work the schedule given to him by his team leader. The Claimant 
made an effort to work that schedule but still considered it to be a recommended schedule. 
It is not clear whether the Claimant worked on May 10, 2010. The Employer has no record of the 
Claimant working on that day and the Claimant does not remember if he worked or not. The 
Claimant felt he may have neglected to clock in prior to working that day. The Claimant was late 
on May 11 and left early on May 13. The Employer discharged the Claimant on May 14 for failing 
to follow the assigned work schedule. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer failed to establish just cause for its decision 
to discharge the Claimant. The Administrative Law Judge determined the Claimant felt the schedule 
was a recommendation, worked on a commission-only basis, and worked more than 40 hour each 
week. 
On appeal to the Board the Employer argues it established just cause. The Employer argues the 
Claimant knew he was expected to work the assigned schedule and to call his supervisor if he was 
going to be late. The Employer also argues it was incorrect for the Claimant to assume he could 
come and go at will merely because his supervisor did. The Employer also argues the Claimant was 
required to work a specific schedule in order to have a higher success rate and the Employer's 
financial interest was jeopardized by the Claimant's refusal to work during the scheduled hours. 
Finally, the Employer argues the Claimant knew what was expected of him and had the ability to 
comply with those expectations. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act provide, in pertinent part: 
A L) i 
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R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it 
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's 
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able 
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a 
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's 
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of 
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have 
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe 
infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the 
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a 
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the 
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
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(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits 
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due 
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the Employer must satisfy all three elements of the 
just cause standard. Here, the Employer failed to satisfy the necessary elements to show just cause. 
To establish culpability, the Employer must show the Claimant's conduct was so serious that 
continuing their relationship would jeopardize the Employer's rightful interests. The Claimant was 
discharged for failing to work his assigned schedule. The Employer argues on appeal that it is 
necessary for employees to work a certain schedule to maximize revenue and to maintain consistency 
and uniformity. The Employer also argues it is immaterial whether the Claimant worked more than 
40 hours each week because he refused to work when the Employer wanted him to work and it was 
detrimental to the Employer's interest for the Claimant not to work the assigned schedule. The 
Claimant, however, provided credible testimony that he altered his schedule to better meet and serve 
clients. As a seasoned sales representative, the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in adjusting 
his schedule to meet with clients. The Claimant also worked more than 40 hours each week and 
worked on a commission only basis. While the Employer has an interest in requiring its employees 
to work certain schedules, the Claimant's actions were intended to benefit clients and maximize his 
personal income. The Employer failed to show how the Claimant's actions actually threatened the 
Employer's rightful interests. The Employer also failed to show the Claimant's actions were so 
egregious that they necessitated his immediate discharge. The Employer failed to establish the 
element of culpability. 
To establish the element of knowledge, the Claimant must have an understanding of the conduct 
expected by the Employer. The Employer argues on appeal that the Claimant knew he was expected 
to work a certain schedule. The Claimant, however, provided credible testimony that he simply did 
not understand the assigned schedule was anything other than a recommendation. He also provided 
credible testimony he saw other employees and his team leader come and go at will and felt he was 
entitled to do the same. The Claimant understood the Employer's expectations to be that he work 
more than 40 hours each week and maximize customer contacts. The Claimant felt he was meeting 
the Employer's expectations and could not have anticipated the negative consequences of not 
adhering to what he believed to be a recommended schedule. The Employer failed to establish the 
element of knowledge. 
The element of knowledge must be established in order to establish the element of control. Absent 
a clear understanding of the Employer's expectations, the Claimant could not alter his actions to meet 
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the Employer's expectations and avoid being discharged. The Employer failed to establish the 
element of control. 
The decision allowing benefits is affirmed. The Board adopts the Administrative Law Judge's 
reasoning and conclusions of law in full. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the 
Claimant effective May 9, 2010, under the provisions of §35 A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act is affirmed. 
The Employer, Prosper Team, Inc., is ineligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this 
claim, as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to 
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
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of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-l 6 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
/s/ Thomas Lewis 
1st William Shaw 
DISSENT: 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision. The Employer has a legitimate interest in 
requiring its employees to work a specific schedule. Employees are generally not allowed to deviate 
from assigned schedules and come and go as they see fit. The Employer provided credible testimony 
that the Claimant's actions threatened its economic interests and its ability to manage its employees. 
I feel the Employer established the element of culpability. 
I feel the Employer also established the element of knowledge. While the Claimant may have 
initially thought the assigned schedule was a recommendation, there should have been no doubt that 
it was a required schedule after receiving the written warning on April 12,2010. The warning makes 
it clear the Claimant was expected to work an assigned schedule. 
Finally, I also feel the Employer established the element of control. The Claimant should have 
understood the Employer expected him to work an assigned schedule and taken steps to ensure he 
worked when the Employer expected him to. 
Is/ Tiffany Vincent 
Date Issued: September 30, 2010 
TV/TL/WS/RS/JM/ddn 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 30th day of September, 2010, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, United States mail to: 
PROSPER TEAM INC 
% HUMAN RESOURCES 
5072 N 300 W STE240 
PROVO UT 84604-5652 
MATT DAVIS 
2119 KING ST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109-1301 
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PROSPER 
Employee Counseling Report 
Employee 
Name; Matt Pari* 
Date of 
Warnings 4/12/10 
Superior 
Name; Jason Brown 
Topic of 
yarning 
Shift Adherence / Job 
Abandonment 
Nature of Violation. 
Verbal Warning: Written WarufruS Suspension: 
I Date: 
L . — — , . • - • — i_ 1 . 1 
Date; 
4/12/10 
Date: ' 
Unsatisfactory Performance, Conduct pr Behavior in the Following j 
Arcafs); ' I 
Matt, you did you not show up for an appointment scheduled at 9 AM on 4/12/2010* 
You ilio didn t coll to Inform mc of your tatdina** until 11:30 AM wh^a your scheduled 
«bift begin* at S AM» V&U did not inform tng tha$ you would b$ 1&fc« and yaiw y&ur 
aohGduled appolntm&at. When you a*e not at work on time and/or feU to fulfill 
scheduled exultations, you Hrait yaui&elf tbe ability to contact/help more people and 
limit yourself and the aan'oany of potential rtyflttte.
 r^ .^.T_. ••• 
Expected Performance Improvements: 
Work your scheduled «bffi of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH I2AM-8PM, fr 8AM-4PM and S &30AM-
IPM. Call ma if you are going to be late or if something somee tip and you wilt not be 
able to malre it to worlc or faffiL« «cheduled consultation. 
Consequences for failure to improve/comply Immediately; Failure to oorrcct the above 
action? immediately may result In ftiture diaciplinary action up to and including 
tenaluatlon. 
Employee Colmiiieiits; 
I understand tHat this employees counseling report will ho retained in my personal 
record, and upon request am entitled to receive & copy. 
Signatures:; 
Employee; / ^ l 
Supervisor: ^?r^C-
Management: Date: 
Thf* dwuraeat contain* UnpuhHshEd, caafideiiiial ted proprietary foformaifan. orProaper fee, No disclosure, 
<lwpJ*cfl&>&r Wf, tt*a 6f*ny pprttan ofUM content* or thwrc material* fhx' day fHtpoto jnqy ba nwd* wfthmic 
the? prior axpreaa written conwnt of FrotBtv Ine, <0 08/09 
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ANDERSON I don't have any other questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Brown, would you like to offer any testimony about those 
requests to reopen? 
BROWN Your Honor, I just say that on both of those occasions w e sat here for 15 minutes waiting 
for a response. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Thank you. All right. We're going to mo\ eon and talk about this job 
separation. These next questions will be for Mr. Biown. Mr. Biown, do you agree that 
Mr. Davis was hired on March 1st of 2010? 
BROWN I do, Your Honor. 
JUDGE And was his last day of woik May 14th of 2010? 
BROWN It was. 
JUDGE Do you agree that this job separation was a discharge, not a quit or a layoff? 
BROWN That's correct, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Was Mr. Davis a sales rep? 
BROWN Yes. 
JUDGE And weie you his immediate supervisor4' 
BROWN I was. Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. And did Mr. Da^ is woik full-time or part-time? 
BROWN Full-time. 
JUDGE Okay. And the peison who filled out die Form 606, that notice of claim filed, she 
indicated that he woiked about four - a little more than 46 houis a week. Do you know 
how she came up with that number? 
BROWN I'm assuming that's the average of his average clock in times. So we have an automatic 
clock in system wheie you clock in. clock out. So I'm assuming that she took, you know, 
the a\erage of-
JUDGE Okay. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-fVAJT-E-r JL^J. "1 m*r w X I J . J » -
) 
5 
7 
S 
9 
0 
1 
2 
0 
BROWN - how many hours he (inaudible). 
JUDGE Okay. Thank j^ou. And did Mr. Davis work for 100% commission; a straight 
commission basis? 
BROWN Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. Mr. Brown, did you participate in the decision to discharge Mr. Davis? 
BROWN I did, Your Honor. 
JUDGE What was the basic reason for the discharge? 
BROWN He failed to adhere to his schedule. 
JUDGE Okay. Was there a final incident, or a last straw that took place shortly before the 
discharge? 
BROWN Yes, there was. Your Honor. 
JUDGE Tell me what happened on the final incident? 
BROWN There was a couple on - if you look at Exhibit 8, on the 13th -
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN - he abandoned his shift -
JUDGE Let me pull that up. 
BROWN - (inaudible). He was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m. that day, and I didn't hear from 
him. 
JUDGE I'm -
BROWN Also on the 11th-
JUDGE Mr. Brown, which day are you talking about? 
BROWN That's the 13th. 
JUDGE Okay. We're starting kind of at the bottom of the list there? 
BROWN Yes. Correct. 
8 
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JUDGE Okay. 8/13? 
BROWN Yeah. So the 13th of May, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. And on May 13th what happened that day? 
BROWN So he was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m., and he just left without any notification to 
me or anybody else. He left at 5:11 p.m., and didn't return to his shift. 
JUDGE Okay. And he was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m.? 
BROWN Correct, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. And what's the Employer's policy about leaving early? 
BROWN You're supposed to just - if you want to leave early, you've got to get approval from your 
immediate supervisor. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. And then let's see, I'm looking at Exhibit 8. So let's just back up there 
on May 11th. Would you just describe for the record what happened on May 1 lth? 
BROWN Mr. Davis did not arrive to his shift, which was supposed to begin at 11:30 a.rn. He 
arrived at about 1:05 in the afternoon, so p.m. And he didn't notify me that that was 
going to happen, and so I had to contact him, I believe, via text or cell phone to see where 
he was at. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN So he described he had car problems. But I never heard back from him, so I had to 
proactively give him the phone call. 
JUDGE Okay. And does the Employer have a policy about tardiness? 
BROWN Yeah. Obviously if you're going to be late, give your immediate supervisor notification 
ahead of time or as soon as you can. 
JUDGE Okay. Now - okay. I think you used the word obviously. But how would Mr. Davis 
have been made aware of those policies? 
BROWN Oh, that's a great question. Your Honor. So during orientation they're given - they are 
given - each and every employee given an attendance and leave policy -
JUDGE Okay. 
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BROWN - and that's in the employee handbook. I believe it's labeled attendance and punctuality. 
JUDGE Okay. And did Mr. Davis - was he required to sign an acknowledgement that he received 
the handbook? 
BROWN Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. And do you have a copy of that signed acknowledgement? 
BROWN Not in front of me, Your Honor, no. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Let's back up to May 10th. What happened on May 10th? 
BROWN It says here he was supposed to come into work. He was scheduled to work 8:00 a.m. to 
5:00 p.m., but again he did not call or notify me by any other means that he would miss 
work. I tried contacting him at 11:35 ami., to remind him of a meeting that was required 
JUDGE Uh-huh. 
BROWN - and it looks like the message was cut off there. But I never heard back, obviously, until 
hours after 8:00 a.m., which was the start of his shift, so basically a no call/no show. 
JUDGE Okay. He never came in that day? 
BROWN I'd have to look at the time punches. Your Honor. No. I'm showing on the 10th, Your 
Honor, no, he did not come in. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN That's on Exhibit 10. 
JUDGE One moment. Okay. Thank you. 
BROWN You're welcome. 
JUDGE All right. When you called him at 11:35, did he - were you able to speak to him? 
BROWN You Honor, to be honest, I cannot remember. It's been a coupe of months. 
JUDGE Sure. Okay. Thank you. And then on May 7th it looks like he had a start time of 8:00 
a.m., and noticed by you at 9:30? 
BROWN An hour and a half later, correct - an hour and 37 minutes later. And then -
10 
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BROWN I don't recall 
JUDGE Okay. Now when Mr. Davis was not at work as scheduled, did that cause some problems 
or concerns for the Employer? 
BROWN Most certainly, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN When they're not here at work obviously they're not able to contact the clients that they've 
given charge over, and thus would led to a lack of revenue -
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN - and sales for the organization. 
JUDGE All right. Any other problems or concerns besides that you just mentioned? 
BROWN Just obviously a lack of trust from Employer to employee. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Does Prosper have a progressive disciplinary policy? 
BROWN They do not. 
JUDGE Okay. And other than Exhibit 9, which was given out on April 12th, did Mr. Davis ever 
receive any other discipline or warnings? 
BROWN Absolutely. He - Your Honor, he got several verbal warnings. 
JUDGE And -
BROWN I do have emails that I failed to include. But, yes, verbal warnings. 
JUDGE Okay. And were those from you? 
BROWN Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. Do you have the dates on any of those documented? 
BROWN Not with me, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. On May 14th why did you make a decision to terminate Mr. Davis' 
employment rather than another written warning, a suspension or some other form of 
discipline? 
13 
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BROWN A great question. Your Honor. So I felt at that time, especially after speaking with our 
counsel with Ms. Susie Young -
JUDGE Uh-huh. 
BROWN - the head of human resources, that it was just an ongoing behavioral issue that hadn't 
been solved; nothing had improved. So at that point I thought it was in die best interest 
of Prosper to part ways. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Now when Mr. Davis was at work as scheduled what was his o\ erall 
work performance like? 
BROWN Depending on the day. Fie was fairly posith e emplo} ee. There were times where he was 
easily distracted or distracted others. 
JUDGE Okay. Do you believe he had all the skills and ability to do his job correctl} ? 
BROWN Absolutely, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. What could Mr. Davis have done differently that would have preserved his job? 
BROWN Great question, Your Honor. I think primarily it's just keeping in constant contact with 
me, his direct supervisor at that time, via phone calls. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN Obviously, just adhering - adhering to his schedule -
JUDGE Okay. 
BROWN - more than anything else. 
JUDGE Is there anything else about this discharge that you would like me to know, Mr. Brown? 
BROWN No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. Thank you. Mr. Anderson, do you have any questions that you would like to ask 
Mr. Brown? ANDERSON Yes, I have a couple. 
JUDGE Sure. 
ANDERSON If I can draw your attention to Exhibit 9, in that counseling session were there any steps 
14 
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I'm trying to follow - wait a minute. When you talked about - let's see, Exhibit 18. All 
right. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Brown. You - and claiming that we had - would 
you say - you did agree that I had the skills necessary to perform the job, correct? 
BROWN You were a very skilled salesman* 
CLAIMANT And you feel that I - you know, with my time that I was there that I was an asset to your 
team? 
BROWN Help me to define asset. 
CLAIMANT I mean, I don't know; was I someone that contributed, or do you feel like that I was a 
good employee for Prosper, I guess if you'd understand it any clearer than that? Does that 
make sense, or no? 
BROWN I'm trying to -
CLAIMANT Mr. Brown, it's pretty simple. I mean, do 3011 have -1 was on your team. We had very 
close communication. You knew which people were putting in the effort and you felt 
like were making a really diligent effort to achieve the things as a team (inaudible) as a 
team. Do you feel like I was doing that? 
BROWN Not consistently, no. Were there some days? Absolutely. Other days, no. 
CLAIMANT And was -1 mean, did - so that's such a vague answer. Would you say that everybody on 
the team was like that? 
BROWN I don't see how that's relevant. 
CLAIMANT Well, you're saying - you're using it as measurement for my dismissal. Wouldn't - if 
everybody on the learn would kind of fit in that same category doesn't really seem fair to 
single me out; would you say that's correct? 
BROWN Your dismissal is based upon attendance. 
CLAIMANT Right I'm getting at something. I don't want to talk in circles. The attendance part of it, 
I was late the day and you said I was gone on the first -1 remember the 10th, and that 
these were the main issues. When we talked in that meeting with me, you and Mr. 
Wilbur, the way this was communicated to me, would you say that these things were like 
very, I guess, detail - or strongly addressed in our meeting as to why I was dismissed? 
And before you just say yes, I - would you say that during that meeting it was brought up 
from you that you thought I - one of the main reasons was a disagreement of -1 don't 
remember the specifics because there really wasn't any of what - of me taking criticism 
from you. That's what I remember you telling me why I wras being let go. 
20 
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JUDGE - you left early? 
CLAIMANT Yeah. But he wasn't there, so it really wasn't -1 - you know, he was gone. And I had to 
leave for a family emergency, which we did talk about later. But, you know, that was 
common practice within the company - or with people there because people came and left 
quite often, including himself. So I don't think it's fair to hold me to that standard as far 
as employment goes if they're not going to hold everybody to it, you know, so. 
JUDGE What -
CLAIMANT And the other reason I was told I was being let go is because I was too argumentative 
with him, or didn't take his advice in the proper way, I guess, which I didn't see coming 
because I felt like we had a pretty good relationship. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Did all of the sales reps have the same work schedule. Mr. Davis? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Did they all have the same work schedule? 
CLAIMANT I guess all the salespeople I assume did. I guess the (inaudible), but yeah I assume it -
like I said, I was under the understanding that it was suggested due to the prior contact 
hours that you had to schedule appointments outside of. And - but I was there, you know, 
over - over 40 hours a week every7 week and, you know, was there most of the time. 
JUDGE Okay. Now you said that it was a common practice for people to leave early. How 
common was it that people left work earl}? 
CLAIMANT People came and went quite regularly, you know, kind of at their discretion, or lesser. 
There was many times there was - you know, it was \ cry -1 would say - to answer the 
question it was very regular, very common. 
JUDGE Okay. Had it always been common, or was this kind of just recently, or? 
CLAIMANT This is the second time I've been hired on by Prosper, and it was better - it was more 
organized - or structured this time, I will agree to that. 
JUDGE Oka>. 
CLAIMANT But. yeah. No, it was a very common practice. You know, it was - it was talked about 
throughout. You know, you saw it with -1 can't (inaudible) foi my own ^alidatIon of 
every7 employee, but everyone on our team I can say at one point. 
JUDGE Okay. Now prior to this warning on April 12th had you ever received any warnings 
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But we did talk about that after and it seemed to be a non-issue at that point. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. So when your supervisor wasn't there, did you normally just tell a 
coworker if you needed to leave early? 
CLAIMANT Well, the practice was to communicate with him. You know, like >ou said - like he said 
that he had a different schedule, so it was kind of like, you know, I guess you would send 
him a text or you send him an email. And then - yeah, yeah, I always communicated with 
people that were there -
JUDGE Okay. 
CLAIMANT - (inaudible). 
JUDGE All right. Do you remember getting a copy of the attendance policy or an employer -
employee handbook at orientation? 
CLAIMANT I don't remember the attendance policy. But. you know, it was one day - it was a one day 
thing for -1 mean, no, I don't remember. Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. So you - do you not remember whether or not you signed an acknowledgement? 
CLAIMANT I don't. 
JUDGE Okay. All right Let's go now to the Exhibit 9, your warning of April 12th. Mr. Brown 
has testified that you had an appointment with a client at 9:00 a.m., and you missed the 
appointment and called - I'm sorry, he called you at 11:30. Can you recall any of the 
circumstances around that event on April 12th? 
CLAIMANT Yeah. I was carpooling, I think I addressed, with another employee. And that 
appointment that was at 9:00 a.m., w as actually on my calendar from the day before, and 
I had actually scheduled that when I got into the office. It wasn't like I missed it and 
nothing happened. I did take responsibility to make sure - they ended up not - you know, 
it was a - we had consultations and then we had times to set up to call people. 
And this happened to be one of those times that I set up to try and call this person for the 
first time. It wasn't a real set appointment that was going to led to like to, you know, a 
possible revenue for the company. I mean, it was -1 ended up talking to the person, but it 
was on my calendar as a first call appointment versus what he was saying that it was a 
consultation type appointment. Which doesn't quite make any sense to me, but it wasn't -
it was something that I was handled when I got in there. 
JUDGE Okay. And why were you late to work that day? 
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JUDGE Okay. And did he tell you that you needed to adhere to the schedule? 
CLAIMANT And again, the way the schedule was presented to me was this is something that another 
team had been trying and these are the hours that we'd like you to work; the highest 
contact hours. It wasn't - you know, I mean, I was there most of the time anyway; and if I 
wasn't, I worked longer hours. But I wasn't under any understanding that it was a set 
schedule because of our commission structure type job. 
JUDGE Okay. Mr. Davis, do you believe that - do you think there were any other reasons for 
your discharge, other than your not adhering to the schedule? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Why don't you tell me why you think you were discharged? 
CLAIMANT I mean, I think that our team as whole was not very productive at the time and hadn't 
been for a while. And, you know, I had spoke to Mr. Brown that, you know, I, you 
know, for Prosper and for me, if I couldn't make this work pretty soon that it wasn't going 
to make sense for me, you know, needing a, you know, higher paying job. And, you 
know, the reason - I'd been hired there before and came back because I had made good 
money and I was. you know, felt like I was putting in even more effort and it just wasn't 
happening. 
And, you know, it was like that for a lot of people on my team, but it just - there was a. 
you know, (inaudible) on our team and the floor as a whole, and I think they were just, 
you know, leaning towards for whatever reason. I mean, I wasn't -1 definitely would say 
that I was probably more outspoken, I guess, maybe more -1 don't know exactly why. I 
mean, it really maybe they just used me to - maybe I was kind of not happy here, and it 
had been addressed. And I think -1 think it had something to do with it. But really, to be 
honest with you, quite shocked at the time that it happened for, you know, the reasons 
that I was told that it was - this agree - this agreement with Mr. Brown - or that I was -1 
think his words were aggressive in feedback to him when, yrou know, I thought like wre 
had a pretty decent relationship and I tried to help out in any way I could. So I just really 
don't -
JUDGE Did he bring that thing - did he bring that up at your final meeting, your discharge 
meeting that you were -
CLAIMANT Yeah, I -
JUDGE - (inaudible) or gave aggressive feedback? 
CLAIMANT Weil, I think it was - oh, I'm not exactly the verbiage that he used. It was just that I was 
like, I can't remember exactly what it - what he said, but it was just that I -1 don't know, 
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talked aggressively. I can't -1 don't really know the exact words. But, yeah, that I didn't 
handle his feedback or, I don't know, constructive criticism very well. It was something 
like that. I can't remember exactly what it was. It was something to that effect. 
JUDGE Okay. Now you started a sentence a minute ago and I'm not sure that I got the end of it. 
You said you had talked to your supervisor and said that if I couldn't make it work, what? 
CLAIMANT Well, when I talked I, you know, talked to Mr. Brown and the other floor managers. 
Kind of figured out what I proved myself, you know. I told him that, you know, well I 
(inaudible) that I, you know, if I could start making - just figure out to make this work, 
but it wasn't going to make sense for me economically. So I really wanted to try and, you 
know, figure out what I could do to make that work. 
JUDGE Oh, okay, thank you. Did he give you any suggestions about what you could do to make 
it more sense economicallv? 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
Well, he told me that, you know, and you can ask him, I mean, he's - you know, I'm an 
educated person. He said that I found a (inaudible) a lot of room that I could improve. I 
talked quite fast, I guess, is what he said. Maybe I could slow it down a little bit. But he 
really just, you know, just there was a lot of suggestions for me as far as improvement. 
That (inaudible) listen to it, I think he (inaudible) listen to some other people. 
Okay. Do you recall - I'm sorry I'm jumping around a little bit. I'm going back through 
my notes seeing if I've missed anything. On the May 11th, when you arrived at 1:05 and 
you were supposed to arrive at 11:30, you indicated to your supervisor that there had 
been some car problems; was that your car or your car pooling car, or what was the 
situation that day? 
No, that was just my car. I wasn't able to -1 can't remember exactly what the reason for 
why it wouldn't start, but I had to -1 took it in to a friend of mine who helped me get it 
going again so I could go into work, but it was -
Okay. All right I don't have any other questions for you, Mr. Davis. Well, yes, I do. 
On Exhibit 9? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE There's just a typed comment there under the little box that saj s expected performance 
improvements; under that box it sa>s consequences for failure to improve may result in 
disciplinary action up to and including termination. Did you believe that your job was in 
jeopardy at that point? 
CLAIMANT Not at all. 
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JUDGE Okay, Prior to your discharge, at any point did you feel like you were in danger of being 
discharged? 
CLAIMANT The discharge came to me as quite a shock, I mean. You know, at that time, you know, 
like I said, I worked all day, but talked -1 just had a sit down with Mr. Brown and the 
floor manager talking to them about things to improve, you know, certain things to help 
the team out and stuff like that. And we were working, I thought, towards more positive 
outcome. So, yeah, I think it was complete surprising. 
JUDGE Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Is there anything else you want to tell me about 
your discharge? 
CLAIMANT No, I think (hat's it. Your Honor. 
JUDGE Okay. Mr. Anderson, would you like to ask Mr. Davis some questions? 
ANDERSON I do, Your Honor. 
JUDGE Uh-huh, go ahead, please. 
ANDERSON Mr. Davis, you said the people regularly came and went and, you know, at various hours; 
do you have any evidence, other than your testimony, to support that? 
CLAIMANT I don't have any documentation. I could, you know -
ANDERSON Okay. Let me ask you dais. Do you know if a person left early or late, do you have 
personal knowledge whether they had communicated with Mr. Brown and had 
permission to do so? 
CLAIMANT Yeah, I do. 
ANDERSON So in each case that the person left early, you would know that they've talked to Mr. 
Brown or not? 
CLAIMANT You just changed what you said. You asked me if I knew of anybody that did that, and 
> then in each case. I didn't know even' time somebody left. no. 
r 
\ ANDERSON Well, I'm trying to - I'm trying to drill down on your testimony. When you said the 
) people regularly -
) 
[ CLAIMANT Okay. 
) 
ANDERSON - came and went -
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CLAIMANT Right. 
ANDERSON 
CLAIMANT 
ANDERSON 
CLAIMANT 
- do you know whether they had permission to do so? 
Everybody in the company? No, I didn't have -1 didn't ask everybody, no. 
How about those that were supervised by Mr. Brown? 
ANDERSON 
A lot of them are very close friends of mine and I did know whether or not they had - not 
every time, like you suggested. But there were times that I know that they didn't. 
So is it your testimony that you do not know whether they had talked to Mr. Brown or 
not? 
CLAIMANT No, that's not what I said. I said there were times I know they did not. I don't know 
about every time whether they did so or not. 
ANDERSON Okay. I think we keep going around in a circle. Let me see if I can rephrase it. Your 
testimony was that people came and went regularly? 
CLAIMANT Right. 
ANDERSON Based on your testimony do you know if a person came or went whether they had talked 
to Mr. Brown or not? 
CLAIMANT Okay. The reason that we're having trouble is you keep changing the question. I don't 
know everybody's per - like every situation, if that's what you're trying to say. If you're 
asking whether or not there were instances where I knew that they had not. there were. I 
don't know every one, though. 
ANDERSON Lei me ask you a question. If I can draw your attention to Exhibit 10? Exhibit 10 says, 
according to on Tuesday, May 11th, you came in at 1:06 p.m., which is corroborating by 
Exhibit 8. However, it also looks like you checked out at 3:03, having a total of two 
hours and 40 minutes; is that correct? 
CLAIMANT Like I said, I didn't find this and it was when - before I left. I didn't even have a chance 
to go over my hours specifically. So I would have to say I don't believe that would have 
been the case, or it would have been addressed. So I don't - there's a lot of times that -
there time issues all (he time with the - the clock on the schedules that you - when we 
were presented these things, we changed them on a regular basis because of the clock in 
and clock out. 
ANDERSON That does not answer the question. 
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XAIMANT I - yeah, I guess so. That's not what it was under my knowledge but, yeah. 
ANDERSON Well, but according to that, then on all three of those days you left work early? 
XAIMANT Well, if you'll look there on the hours, I mean I - it must have -
ANDERSON Just answer the question. According to die schedule that you were given as written on 
the warning of Exhibit 9 on April 12th, it said that you were to work until 8:00? 
CLAIMANT Right. Well, I'm just -
ANDERSON (Inaudible) date it appears that you did not work until 8:00; is that your recollection that 
you, in fact, left early in -
CLAIMANT I -
ANDERSON - contradiction of the stated policy? 
CLAIMANT Okay, I'm just going to tell you. I know what you're trying to get at. But the thing is, my 
whole point of this is we communicated our schedules with our team leader, and that's 
why I don't - I'm saying that we weren't held to that schedule. I still worked nine hours 
and almost eight hours on the next day. So I -1 know that I had other things and other 
appointments that were going on that kept me from taking a break during the day like 
other people did, that made it so I was able to leave early and still maintain my over 
eight-hour requirement. 
ANDERSON Well, is it your testimony that you could effectively scheduled - set your own schedule? 
CLAIMANT We were required to schedule our own appointments, yes. 
ANDERSON I didn't ask about appointments. I asked were you able to set your own schedule? 
CLAIMANT To some degrees we were. 
ANDERSON So is it jour testimony that the written warning on Exhibit 9 where it specifically told you 
the hours to work, that that - even though it is a written warning, it really didn't apply to 
you? 
) CLAIMANT I don't appreciate the attacks here. I didn't -1 never said it didn't apply to me. What I was 
3 trying to say, and I'll try" to very clearly and see if- see if we can make sense of this, how 
1 it - our schedules worked, there was recommended schedules. Sometimes you had 
2 people that were at 9:00 on the West Coast. And so when you did that, you're able to 
work different hours because they didn't want you working a lot of overtime, okay? So I 
wasn't thinking I was unique. I was working within the parameters of the schedule still 
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ANDERSON 
CLAIMANT 
ANDERSON 
doing my job to my best ability. 
And what happened on those days as far as what I had scheduled and what was going on 
as far as, you know, the appointments and everything that was going on with that, the 
actual things that required me to do my job I was doing obviously. So pretty -1 know 
you're trying - you're trying to get at that I think that I didn't have to adhere to the 
schedule. That's not true. We worked within these parameters. And the whole company 
worked as - 1 mean you talked to somebody and you would work, you know, around 
certain schedules to try to get people in when you can, because you had your schedule fill 
up and then you had to work around that to get other people. And then I'd - you know, I'd 
be there until 11:00 on a Friday niglil sometimes. You know, it's just kind of how it 
worked. 
If I can draw jour attention to the middle of Exhibit 9, it says work scheduled shift, and it 
gives specific hours; were you told to work those hours? 
I think I've addressed this. I told you there was a suggested schedule, which if you only 
work those hours and somebody wanted to meet outside of those hours, yeah, we did - we 
were allowed to do that. And you know, they didn't want us working more than 40 hours 
a week. I don't know how much more clear I can make this. That was a recommended 
schedule. But as a commission job working with people, setting appointments based on 
what their schedules were, sometimes you had to make, you know, changes to your 
schedule so you could fit it to theirs, and that was okay. 
Let me ask you, did Mr. Brown tell you at the time of separation that you were being 
terminated for your attendance? 
CLAIMANT No, not for my attendance. Lack of communication he said. 
ANDERSON So it's now your testimony that >ou were not told that because you were unable to keep 
the schedule that you were let go? 
CLAIMANT Excuse me? I'm not sure if I understand what jou're trying to get at. 
ANDERSON You have a written w arning in April and you were discharged in May because you were 
not keeping the schedule. If you're not keeping the schedule, isn't that an attendance 
problem? 
CLAIMANT You asked me what was said in the meeting of why I was discharged. Thai was not what 
the reason was. 
ANDERSON My recollection was that you said that one of the reasons you were told you were being 
terminated, one was for your attendance, and two because they thought that jou had an 
attitude or, you know7, you didn't take criticism. If -
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CLAIMANT No. 
ANDERSON - Fm not understanding your testimony correcti>, can you please state the specific -
CLAMANT Okay. 
ANDERSON - reasons you were told that you were being terminated? 
CLAIMANT 
ANDERSON 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
ANDERSON 
Okay. And, yeah, 111 tell you exactly. And you know, your -1 don't know, you're trying 
to attack me on things and twist words around, which I didn't say. And let me just tell 
you very clearly, it was like the lack of communication Mr. Brown said to me, and that -
that was not -1 didn't say specifically it was because of my attendance. It was because -
and through this whole conversation the main addressed points were that there was 
communication or there's, you know, things that kept me from getting into work on time. 
But it wasn't an attendance issue primarily, no. 
So if there's a lack of communication, and Fm not trying to put words in your mouth; Fm 
trying to understand. If you're told that there's a lack of communication because you're 
not into work at time, it's your testimony that that is not an attendance problem? 
Okay. Maybe I can shed some light on this. I was taking pretty careful notes when Mr. 
Davis provided his earlier testimony. When I asked him what reasons were you given for 
your discharge, he said there were two. Number one, he didn't know where I went at 
5:00. He went on to say but he wasn't even there. He said it was a common practice 
among all, even supervisors. 
Number two, he said Fm too argumentative. I didn't take advice properly. Later on he 
said something about he was a little aggressive and didn't give proper feedback. So he 
didn't, as far as my notes show, Mr. Davis did not say attendance was one of the reasons 
for his discharge. 
Thank you. 
Of course Fm going to go back and review the record but, Mr. Anderson, I think Mr. 
Davis is right when he told me the reasons for his discharge he did not say that 
attendance was one of the problems. 
That's fine, Your Honor. I guess we understand the testimony a little different. Let me, 
Mr. Davis, draw your attention to Exhibit 12. 
CLAIMANT Okay. 
ANDERSON In the middle of the page there's some questions and answers; are those your cmswers that 
you provided to the Department when you tiled for unemployment? 
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